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THIE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND
THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
SUGGESTED ATTORNEY LIABILITY FOR
BREACH OF DUTY TO DISCLOSE FRAUD TO
THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COAMhISSION
ALAN C. MYERS*
The imposition of increased obligations and liabilities on securities
lawyers threatens not only the attorney, but the quality of his representation
as well. Alan Myers examines the possible consequences of the current
expansion of liability, and suggests what the securities lawyer's obligations
and liabilities should be under DR 7-102(B)(1) and DR 4-101(C)(3) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility.
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I. PREFACE: THE EMERGING RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE SECURITIES
LAWYER'
-TNTIL quite recently, judicial decisions finding attorneys liable
%-)under the federal securities laws did not involve attorneys acting
as attorneys, but instead involved attorneys participating directly in
"blatantly fraudulent securities schemes."'2 A lawyer's performance did
not give rise to a cause of action for injunctive relief, and only his
client was liable in damages to the investing public. 3 Similarly, SEC
actions against attorneys were reserved for principals in palpably
fraudulent schemes. 4
This traditional reluctance of the SEC to take action against attor-
neys was at least partially attributable to an implicit belief that an
attorney owed primary allegiance to his clientA In American Finance
Co., 6 the SEC articulated this traditional view of the attorney's role by
stating:
Though owing a public responsibility, an attorney in acting as the client's advisor,
defender, advocate and confidant enters into a personal relationship in which his
principal concern is with the interests and rights of his client.
7
We live, however, in an age "where [the] consumer is king."
Sanctions and liabilities under the securities laws are no longer re-
served for the attorney who is an active participant or prime mover in
an obviously deceptive scheme. 9
Although the nature and extent of the securities lawyer's new
responsibilities to the investing public, and the civil damages that will
1. See Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities
Lawyer, Banking, Corporation and Business Law Section, New York State Bar Ass'n, Jan. 24,
1974, in [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,631 (hereinafter cited as
Emerging Responsibilities].
2. Lowenfels, Expanding Public Responsibilities of Securities Lawyers: An Analysis of tile
New Trend in Standard of Care and Priorities of Duties, 74 Colum. L. Rev. 412, 413 (1974); see
Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. Law. 1153 (1972).
3. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 413-15.
4. Id. at 413-14.
5. Id. at 415.
6. 40 S.E.C. 1043 (1962) (per curiam).
7. Id. at 1049, quoted in Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 415-16, and Schneider, Securities
Lawyers' Professional Responsibility, in SEC '75, at 3, 5 (Law Journal Press 1975). The ABA
Committe on Professional Responsibility formerly expressed a similar view. As recently as 1965 It
suggested that, aside from the absolute prohibition against intentionally aiding fraud, the lawyer's
duty to a public agency was secondary to his duty to his client. See ABA Comm. on Professional
Ethics, Opinions, No. 314 (1965).
8. Emerging Responsibilities, supra note 1, at 83,693.
9. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 413. See generally ABA Comm. on Business Torts, Section of
Litigation, Liability of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws (P. Gruenberger 1975).
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surely flow therefrom,10 are still "in an embryonic stage of develop-
ment and their boundaries are by no means fixed or immutable,""
recent SEC releases, staff speeches' 2 and increasingly frequent suits
against lawyers and law firms,' 3 have signaled a departure from the
SEC position in American Finance and an intention to require securi-
ties lawyers "to redefine their roles, and to assume more of an
enforcement and protection-of-the-public-interest approach to their
practices."' 4 Such an approach, premised on the SEC's contention that
the securities lawyer's primary duty is to the investing public, not to
his client, and that he has an obligation to report his client's securities
10. "Since the [National Student Marketing Complaint] a spate of private class actions have
been filed against attorneys, espousing and extending the new theory expressed in [that]
complaint." Bauman, A Comment on the Perils of a Securities Lawyer, 3 Sec. Reg. L.J. 291
(1975); accord, ABA Section of Litigation, Lawyers and Accountants on Trial: Professional
Liability 77 (1975) (remarks of Richard Murray, General Counsel of Touche, Ross & Co.); see
Wall St. J., Feb. 3, 1976, at 1, col. I (surge in attorney malpractice actions).
11. Cheek, Professional Responsibility and Self-Regulation of the Securities Lawyer, 32
Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 597, 618 (1975).
12. E.g., Address by Gonson, Some Observations on the Responsibilities of a Securities
Lawyer in the SEC's "Disclosure Process," Annual Convention of the Federal Bar Ass'n, Sept.
11, 1975; Emerging Responsibilities, supra note 1; Sonde, The Responsibility of Professionals
Under the Federal Securities Laws-Some Observations, 68 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1 (1973). As a matter
of policy, the SEC disclaims responsibility for private publications or speeches by any of its
members or employees.
13. For examples of recent SEC injunctive actions where lawyers have been named as
defendants see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); SEC v. American Associated
Sys., Inc., 482 F.2d 1040 (6th Cir. 1973) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1130 (1974); SEC v.
Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v. Universal Major Indus.
Corp., [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,212 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v.
National Student Mktg. Corp., 59 F.R.D. 305 (D.D.C. 1973); SEC v. Sitomer, Sitomer &
Porges, [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 94,184 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); SEC v. Ezrine
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 93,594 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). For examples of
SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings against attorneys pursuant to SEC Rule of Practice
2(e) see note 174 infra.
14. Schneider, supra note 7, at 6; see Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New
Role for Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 437, 438 (1974). In attempting to justify the securities
attorney's expanded role in the enforcement process, recent SEC and court decisions and recent
speeches by SEC personnel have stressed that the attorney's expertise is relied upon in effecting
either a full and effective disclosure or a successful fraud. See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489
F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964); Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18,
1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,407, at 83,175 n.20; Garrett Speaks
on Professional Responsibility, BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 255, at A-20 (June 5, 1974); see
Sonde, supra note 12, at 20 ("[T]he federal securities laws cannot function effectively without
continued reliance upon the professional integrity of those attorneys and accountants who practice
before the Commission."). See also Lawyers and Accountants Must Raise Standards, Garrett
Tells ABA, BNA Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. No. 223, at A-15 (Oct. 17, 1973).
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violations to the Commission, i5 may necessitate more detailed, candid
disclosures to the SEC.
Needless to say, the SEC's new posture has not lacked critics. The
most strenuous criticism has come from those who assert that the
SEC's position, threatening dilution of the traditional privilege of a
client to consult with his attorney in the fullest confidence without fear
of possible disclosure at some indefinite point in the future, is certain to
undermine the attorney-client relationship.1 6 The amount and kind of
information revealed to corporate counsel may be affected as corporate
clients learn that it could be imprudent to reveal too much to an
attorney who may owe his primary duty to the SEC. 17 In fact, some
practitioners are concerned that in this particular area of the law, if the
client is not secure in his belief that the attorney-client privilege will be
respected, it is a virtual certainty that he will thereafter be less than
candid with his attorney. One commentator has said:
[T]he savvy client, the knowledgeable client, will not talk to the corporation's lawyer;
he will have his conversations elsewhere. As a result, society will be deprived of the
vital opportunity for corporate lawyers in the hard cases to stop violations before they
occur. '
8
The current trend has also led to an increase in the cost of, or even
15. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 418-19; Emerging Responsibilities, supra note 1, at 83,689:
"We are consistently reminded that historically the attorney has been an advocate, that his
professional ethics have over the years defined his function in those terms, that such a role
includes unremitting loyalty to the interests of his client . .. . I would suggest that in securities
matters ... the attorney will have to function in a manner more akin to that of the auditor than
to that of the advocate"; Finkelstein, Who is the Client? Attorney's Role in Securities Law, 171
N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1974, at 1, col. 3.
16. See Guzzardi, Those Zealous Cops on the Securities Beat, 90 Fortune 144, 196 (1974)
(comments of Kenneth Bialkin). See also The SEC's New Impact on Corporations, Bus. Week,
Aug. 10, 1974, at 100, 102 (comments of Monroe Freedman). For other criticisms see Cheek,
supra note 11, at 599; Freedman, Securities Enforcement: A Reply to Critics, 171 N.Y.L.J., May
30, 1974, at 1, col. 1. Dean Freedman's views are the subject of much controversy, and led to a
lively debate with Martin Lipton, an experienced securities practitioner, in the pages of the New
York Law Journal. See Freedman, Professional Responsibility in Securities Regulation, 171
N.Y.L.J., Apr. 24, 1974, at 1, col. 1; Lipton, Securities Bar and SEC Enforcement Defended,
171 N.Y.L.J., May 14, 1974, at 1, col. I ("The basic fault with Dean Freedman's attack is his
nonacceptance of the changed role of the lawyer in modern society." Id. at 4, col. 11).
Commissioner Sommer noted that Freedman has "apparent unconcern with the public respon-
sibilities of counsel in securities matters." Sommer Praises Lipton, 171 N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1974,
at 1, col. 3; Lipman, supra note 14, at 475-76.
17. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 435.
18. See Leiman, Responsibility to Report Securities Law Violations, in PLI Sixth Annual
Institute on Securities Regulation 276 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer, J. Schupper, J. Jewett & J.
Thomson eds. 1975) (comments of Mr. Wheat) [hereinafter cited as Leiman]. No studies
confirming.or contradicting the feared decrease in client candor have been uncovered. See also pt.
V infra.
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inability to obtain, malpractice coverage,1 9 and this is certain to affect
the availability of quality securities representation. Rather than weed-
ing out the careless, the competent may be deterred, particularly from
representing marginal companies. If marginal companies are able to
secure competent representation, the cost of the representation will
undoubtedly reflect the lawyer's costs as a near guarantor of his legal
services.2 0 But in addition to the probable increased cost of and
decreased availability of quality legal services, to the extent that
counsel risks personal liability in handling complex, litigation-prone
matters, his interest in self-protection may actually conflict with the
interests of his corporate client; he may decide that it is safer to protect
the investing public than to effectively represent his client-the corpo-
ration and its existing shareholder.
2 1
These problems have been brought to a head, and the debate has
become all the more impassioned, since the SEC's filing of its now
celebrated National Student Marketing complaint. 22 After briefly ex-
amining that complaint, with special emphasis upon the SEC's concep-
tion of an attorney's duty to disclose fraud to it, this Article will discuss
the extent to which there should be a duty to disclose securities fraud,
and the consequences of such a breach. The discussion of an attorney's
duty will involve an examination of the attorney-client privilege23 and
the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility. 24 The discussion of the
consequences of a breach of duty will entail an examination of the
recent development of aiding and abetting liability, and a treatment of
SEC Rule of Practice 2(e). 25
II. National Student Marketing: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE DUTY
TO DISCLOSE FRAUD TO THE SECURITIES
AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
On February 3, 1972, the SEC charged National Student Marketing
Corporation and its accountants, Peat, Marwick, & Mitchell Com-
19. See Bauman, A Comment on the Perils of a Securities Lawyer, 3 Sec. Reg. L.J. 291
(1975) (leading malpractice carrier has withdrawn coverage of securities liability); Wall St. J.,
Feb. 3, 1976, at 1, col. 1.
20. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 435-36; accord, Bauman, A Comment on the Perils of a
Securities Lawyer, 3 Sec. Reg. L.J. 291, 292 (1975).
21. Leiman, supra note 18, at 288; see Schneider, supra note 7, at 9.
22. SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. T 93,360 (D.D.C. 1972) [hereinafter cited as National Student Marketing Complaint].
23. See pt. III infra.
24. See pt. IV infra.
25. See pt. V infra.
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pany, with extensive violations of the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws. It also joined as defendants two of the nation's
most prestigious law firms, White & Case of New York, and Lord,
Bissell & Brook of Chicago. "Of greater significance than the filing of
the complaint itself was the Commission's claim that the law firms had
an obligation of allegiance to the Commission greater than the obliga-
tion to their own clients."'26
The National Student Marketing allegations have been discussed at
length elsewhere 27 and need not be repeated here in full. For purposes
of analyzing the SEC's conception of the duties of the securities
attorney, it is sufficient to note that White & Case, and Lord, Bissell &
Brook, counsel for the two parties, allowed a merger between National
Student Marketing and Interstate National Corporation to take place
without informing shareholders of material facts first disclosed after
the proxy solicitation approving the merger. In reliance upon a provi-
sion in the merger agreement permitting the board of directors of each
corporation to waive shareholder approval of the disclosures, 28 the two
law firms issued opinion letters stating inter alia that " 'all ... actions
and proceedings required by law or this agreement ... have been duly
and validly taken.' ",29
Paragraph 48(i) of the Commission's National Student Marketing
complaint explains how the SEC believes these firms failed to fulfill
their responsibility to the investing public:
As part of the fraudulent scheme [counsel] failed to refuse to issue their opinions...
and failed to insist that the financial statements be revised and shareholders be
resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing their respective clients and, under
the circumstances, notify the plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading nature of
the nine month financial statements. 30
The SEC's position that counsel should have withdrawn and dis-
closed the "fraud" is unprecedented. 31 This position at least impliedly
26. Goldberg, Ethical Dilemma: Attorney-Client Privilege vs. the National Student Market-
ing Doctrine, 1 Sec. Reg. L.J. 297, 298 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Ethical Dilemma).
27. See Golberg, Introduction to Expanding Responsibilities Under the Securities Laws at
xiii-xvii (S. Goldberg ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Expanding Responsibilities].
28. See Ethical Dilemma, supra note 26, at 300-01.
29. Id. at 301-02.
30. National Student Marketing Complaint 48(i), supra note 22, at 91,913-17 (emphasis
added).
31. Note that if White & Case was justified in relying upon the waiver provision then there
was no fraud to disclose, while if they were not justified in relying upon the waiver then they
should have refused to issue the opinion letter, in which case there would have been no closing
and, again, no fraud to disclose. Thus, it has been said that the National Student Marketing
complaint "confuses two distinct issues-the legality of giving the opinion and a lawyer's duty to
notify the SEC of a client's planned violation." Shipman, The Need for SEC Rules to Govern the
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suggests that the SEC is seeking to define an attorney's duties to his
client, to the public and to the Commission in light of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and that the SEC believes that the Code
requires disclosure. 32 The question remains whether this SEC position
represents a good policy in light of the purposes of the attorney-client
privilege and the objectives of the securities laws.
I-[. THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE 3 3
A. In General
The attorney-client privilege34 is important to an understanling of
the nature of the lawyer-client relationship and the social interest in
Duties and Civil Liabilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Statutes, 34 Ohio St. L.J.
231, 234 (1973). See also Symposium, Lawyers' Responsibilities and Liabilities Under the
Securities Laws, 11 Colum. J.L. & Soc. Prob. 99, 104 (1974).
32. A reading of ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(B)(1) (1975) suggests, at
least to this author, that paragraph 48(i) of the National Student Marketing complaint was drafted
in direct reliance on this disciplinary rule. See text accompanying note 82 infra for the text of DR
7-102(B)(1). But despite the SEC's apparent reliance on the Code in this instance, on other
occasions members of the SEC have contended that a securities lawyer's duties may surpass those
of the ordinary attorney who is bound by the Code. See, e.g., Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities
Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,407,
at 83,175 n.20. See also Emerging Responsibilities, supra note 1, at 83,689-90; text accompanying
notes 179-80 infra; note 160 infra. On the issue of the Code and the National Student Marketing
complaint compare Koch, Attorneys' Liability: The Securities Bar and the Impact of National
Student Marketing, 14 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 883 (1973) (the attorney-client relationship must
give way to the protection of investors under the facts of National Student Marketing), with
Karmel, Attorneys' Securities Laws Liabilities, 27 Bus. Law. 1153, 1162-64 (1972) (an attorney's
duty to disclose fraud to the SEC or to the public investor could prove inimical to existing
attorney-client relationships).
33. The Federal Rules of Evidence, which took effect on July 1, 1975, do not contain a
specific attorney-client privilege, although an earlier draft of the rules, see 56 F.R.D. 183, 235-37,
did contain a detailed attorney-client privilege. Rule 501, the general federal rule with respect to
privileges, provides in pertinent part "[T]he privilege of a witness ... shall be governed by the
principles of the common law as they may be interpreted by the courts of the United States in the
light of reason and experience. However, in civil actions and proceedings, with respect to an
element of a claim or defense as to which State law supplies the rule of decision, the privilege of a
witness ... shall be determined in accordance with State law." Rule 501 appears to suggest that
federal common law will govern the applicability of the attorney-client privilege in federal
securities cases. See also Kaminsky, State Evidentiary Privileges in Federal Civil Litigation, 43
Fordham L. Rev. 923 (1975).
34. Any testimonial privilege is an exception to the general duty of every person to testify as
to all facts inquired of in a court of law. The hornbook rule on the attorney-client privilege is that
"(1) where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal advisor in his capacity
as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client,
(6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser,
(8) except if the protection be waived." 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (McNaughton rev. ed.
1961). In United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (1. Mass. 1950), Judge
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fostering that relationship. Accordingly, it is also important to an
understanding of the policy considerations underlying the proper reso-
lution of the problems raised by National Student Marketing.35
The attorney-client privilege exists to promote optimal advocacy by
encouraging clients to communicate all relevant facts to counsel3 6
"without fear of consequences or the apprehension of disclosure. '37
"The protection is not [limited] to proceedings pending or in contem-
plation, nor is it material that the client [is not] before the court where
disclosure is sought . ... 38
Wigmore suggests four criteria for determining when a privilege
should exist. Of these criteria, the fourth is most pertinent to this
Article's analysis:
(4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communica-
tions must be greater than the benefit thereby gained for the correct disposal of the
litigation.3 9
B. Ongoing and Future Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-
Client Privilege40
A client's communications with his attorney regarding past, com-
pleted crimes or frauds are privileged and cannot be divulged without
Wyzanski formulated the classic rule that "[t]he privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of
the privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was made
(a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the attorney
was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the purpose of securing
primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance in some legal
proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has
been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client." Id. at 358-59. See also N.Y. C.P.L.R.
§ 4503(a) (McKinney 1963).
35. See Borden, Privilege and the Attorney-Client Relationship, in Expanding Respon-
sibilities, supra note 27, at 36.
36. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 863 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 833
(1956).
37. Modem Woodmen of America v. Watkins, 132 F.2d 352, 354 (5th Cir. 1942); accord,
United States v. Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318, 336 (1915); W. Richardson, Evidence § 410
(10th ed. 1973); C. McCormick, Evidence § 98 (2d ed. 1972); J. Weinstein & M. Berger,
Evidence 503[02] (1975); 8 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 2291. See also ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility EC 4-1 (1975) ("A client must feel free to discuss whatever he wishes with his lawyer
and a lawyer must be equally free to obtain information beyond that volunteered by his client.")
38. Elliott v. United States, 23 App. D.C. 456, 468 (1904).
39. 8 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis deleted). The first three criteria are:
"(1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed. (2) This
element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation
between the parties. (3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to
be sedulously fostered." Id. (emphasis deleted).
40. For comparison of this exception to the attorney-client privilege and an attorney's affirmative
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the client's consent. 41 However, with respect to ongoing and future
crimes or frauds the general rule is that communications made by a
client to his attorney are not privileged, 42 irrespective of whether the
attorney knows about or is involved in the fraud or crime.
43
C. Prima Facie Proof of Fraud
The attorney-client privilege may not be pierced by a mere allega-
tion of crime of fraud;4 4 otherwise an attorney's testimony could be
compelled by baseless allegations, and the crime-fraud exception
would emasculate the attorney-client privilege. Rather, what is re-
quired is some colorable charge of fraud; that is, there must be "prima
facie evidence that . . . has some foundation in fact. 4S
The rationale for a prima facie showing appears to be a policy of
defining exceptions to the attorney-client privilege as narrowly as
possible so as not to impede freedom of consultation between clients
and their lawyers. As will be discussed later in this Article, 4 6 this
consideration should also mandate a heavy burden of proof to over-
come the attorney-client privilege in securities matters.
duty to disclose facts clearly showing that "[h]is client has, in the course of the representation,
petpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal.. ." (ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR
7-102(B)(1) (1975)) see pt. IV(C)(5) infra.
41. C. McCormick, Evidence § 95 (2d ed. 1972);2 J. Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's
Evidence 503(d)(1)[01], at 503-58 (1975); 24 Fordhamn L. Rev. 290 (1955).
42. E.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (dictum) ("A client who consults an
attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission of a fraud .... must let the truth be
told."); C. McCormick, Evidence § 95 (2d ed. 1972); Uniform Rule of Evidence 502(dJ(1); 2 J.
Weinstein & M. Berger, Weinstein's Evidence 503(d)(1)[01] (1975); 24 Fordham L. Rev. 290
(1955). Perhaps the rationale for the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege was
best expressed in the early leading case of Queen v. Cox, 14 Q.B. 153, 168 (1884): "In order that
the [attorney-client privilege] may apply there must be both professional confidence and profes-
sional employment, but if the client has a criminal object in view in his communications with his
solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent. The client must either conspire with his
solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is avowed, the client does not consult his advisor
professionally, because it cannot be the solicitor's business to further any criminal object. If the
client does not avow his object he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts, which is the
foundation of the supposed confidence, does not exist. The solicitor's advice is obtained by a
fraud." Accord, Matthews v. Hoagland, 48 N.J. Eq. 455, 21 A. 1054 (Ch. 1891).
43. United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 922
(1974); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958
(1971). See generally 8 Wigmore, supra note 34, §§ 2298-99.
44. United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308 U.S: 589 (1939);
O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581.
45. O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] A.C. 581, 604; accord, United States v. Shewfelt, 455
F.2d 836, 840 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 944 (1972); Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385
F.2d 143, 144 (4th Cir. 1967); United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37, 40 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 308
U.S. 589 (1939).
46. See pts. IV(C) & V infra.
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D. Applicability of the Attorney-Client Privilege to SEC Proceedings
McMann v. SEC4 7 involved an application to enjoin the plaintiff's
stockbroker from complying with an SEC order to turn over to the
Commission for use in an SEC investigation papers and documents
relating to the plaintiffs account. The court said that SEC investiga-
tions are "subject to the same testimonial privileges as judicial proceed-
ings,"48 including the attorney-client privilege. 49
E. The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege-Will It Survive?
Under federal law, the attorney-client privilege applies to corpora-
tions.50 The leading case is Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas
Association.5 1 There the court reviewed the law relating to and the
policies underlying the privilege (i.e., to encourage clients to seek legal
advice and to communicate candidly with counsel),52 and concluded
that corporations may avail themselves of the privilege in the same
manner and to the same extent as non-corporate clients. 53 This princi-
ple has been repeatedly reaffirmed.5 4
In Garner v. Wolfinbarger,55 a recent common law and securities
fraud action in which stockholders sued their corporation and its
officers to recover the purchase price of their stock, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the continued existence of an attorney-client
privilege for the corporate client.
The corporation is not barred from asserting [the attorney-client privilege] merely
because those demanding information enjoy the status of stockholders. 6
47. 87 F.2d 377 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937).
48. Id. at 378.
49. See Annot., 133 A.L.R. 732 (1941).
50. See generally Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale
L.J. 953 (1956); Comment, The Application in the Federal Courts of the Attorney-Client Privilege
to the Corporation, 39 Fordham L. Rev. 281 (1970); Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 424 (1970).
51. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
52. Id. at 322, 324; see 8 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 2291.
53. 320 F.2d at 322-23; accord, City of Phila. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp.
483, 484 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
54. E.g., Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 263 (1964); IBM v. United States, 471 F.2d 507 (2d
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 980 (1974) (by implication); United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d
459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1969); Federal Say. and Loan Ins. Corp. v.
Fielding, 343 F. Supp. 537, 544 (D. Nev. 1972). See also Note, Attorney-Client Privilege for
Corporate Clients: The Control Group Test, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 424 (1970).
55. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).
56. Id. at 1103.
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However, the court held that the corporate attorney-client privilege is
not absolute where it is asserted against those to whom the corporation
owes a fiduciary duty.S7
[W]here the corporation is in suit against its stockholders on charges of acting
inimically to stockholder interests, protection of those interests as well as those of the
corporation and of the public require that the availability of the privilege be subject to
the right of the stockholders to show cause why it should not be invoked in the
particular instance.ss
But while the special nature of the corporate-stockholder relation-
ship led the court in Garner to reevaluate the balance of interests that
traditionally has determined the availability of the privilege and
caused it to hold that the attorney-client privilege is qualified in
stockholder derivative suits, the decision clearly did not limit the
privilege as against other adversaries to whom no similar fiduciary
obligation is owed.
The principles underlying Garner were extended by the recent case
of Valente v. PepsiCo, Inc.5 9 PepsiCo bought seventy-four percent of
the outstanding stock of Wilson and consummated a short form merger
under the applicable Delaware Corporation Law. When Wilson's
minority shareholders then sued PepsiCo for damages, PepsiCo
claimed the attorney-client privilege as to a number of documents
relating to the reasons for PepsiCo's decision to use that particular
take-over device. The court rejected the assertion of the privilege,
relying on a purported rationale of Garner to the effect that the societal
interest in preserving fiduciary duties outweighs the societal interest
underlying the attorney-client privilege. 60
The court first disallowed the privilege with respect to opinions
issued to PepsiCo by attorneys who were directors of Wilson while
representing PepsiCo in relation to the proposed take-over of Wilson.
Since the attorneys owed confficting fiduciary duties to PepsiCo and
Wilson, the court held that, as in Garner, the privilege could not be
57. The court emphasized that the fiduciary obligation of corporate management to its
stockholders was the basis of its holdings: "We consider [the balancing of injury from disclosure
against the benefit from correct disposition of the case] in a particularized context: where the client
asserting the privilege is an entity which in the performance of its functions acts wholly or partly
in the interests of others, and those others, or some of them, seek access to the subject matter of
the communications." Id. at 1101.
58. Id. at 1103-04. The court referred to 8 Wigmore, supra note 34, § 2285(4) (quoted at text
accompanying note 39 supra), and concluded that the benefit from disclosure would outweigh the
injury that might result. Id. at 1100-02.
59. 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975).
60. Id. at 368.
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used to shield the fiduciary from the shareholder-principal to whom he
must account. 61 It should be noted, however, that in Garner the
shareholder-principal was the corporation's own shareholders, whereas
in Valente the shareholder-principal was Wilson's shareholders, who
were permitted to pierce PepsiCo's corporate attorney-client privilege.
Moreover, Garner had explicitly refused to hold that the corporate-
shareholder fiduciary relationship itself outweighed the policies ad-
vanced by the attorney-client privilege. 62 Whereas Garner held that
shareholders have a burden of showing good cause to overcome the
privilege, 63 Valente shifted the burden of proof to the corporation to
show cause to sustain the privilege.
[W]here a corporation seeks advice from legal counsel, and the information relates to
the subject of a later suit by a minority shareholder in the corporation, the corporation
is not entitled to claim the privilege as against its own shareholder, absent some special
cause. 64
Second, the court disallowed the privilege as to four other docu-
ments on the ground that the client, PepsiCo, as the controlling
shareholder of Wilson, owed fiduciary duties to Wilson and that to
subordinate these duties to the attorney-client privilege would be a
fraud.
Where the fiduciary has conflicting interests of its own, to allow the attorney-client
privilege to block access to the information and bases of its decisions as to the persons
to whom the obligation is owed would allow the perpetration of frauds.65
The court continued in a footnote:
The Court here does not hold that the attorney-client privilege was used in the
perpetration of fraud .... Rather the decision of the Court is that where a fiduciary
represents conflicting interests, particularly where one of those interests is its own, the
only purpose to be served by the use of the privilege to withhold information from those
to whom the fiduciary obligation runs is fraud. The more general and important right
of those who look to fiduciaries to safeguard their interests, to be able to determine the
proper functioning of the fiduciary, outweighs the need for the privilege .... 66
In sum, Valente extends Garner both by permitting shareholders of
one corporation to overcome another corporation's attorney-client priv-
ilege and by eliminating the requirement that the shareholder show
cause to overcome the privilege. After Valente, mere assertion of a
61. Id.
62. 430 F.2d at 1103-04; see text accompanying note 56 supra.
63. 430 F.2d at 1104.
64. 68 F.R.D. at 367 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 369.
66. Id. at 369-70 n.16 (emphasis added).
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fiduciary relationship would appear sufficient to overcome the privi-
lege. 67
Garner and Valente raise at least two major problems for corpora-
tions and their counsel. The first is whether courts will find additional
"particularized contexts" warranting further exceptions to the at-
torney-client privilege. 68 For example, a court conceivably could find a
fiduciary relationship between a publicly-traded corporation and the
SEC or the investing public. It is suggested, however, that further
exceptions in this area should be made slowly and cautiously lest a
corporation inadvertently be denied the right to effective legal counsel.
Second, the spectre of stockholders piercing the attorney-client privi-
lege in future derivative suits will undoubtedly affect the attorney-
corporate client relationship. One possible result is that management
will be less candid with counsel. 69 Another is that counsel may refrain
from putting in writing its opinions as to the legality of a securities
transaction, or may become overly cautious in advising on legality10
for fear of shareholder discovery of the advice and consequent suit-by
the shareholders, or by the corporation if the corporation is sued by the
shareholders. A final possibility is that corporate management will
accept counsel's opinion as to the legality of a particular securities
transaction rather than risk shareholder discovery of such unheeded
advice. 71
There nevertheless will be instances when a client will choose to
disregard its attorney's advice and take action which the attorney
clearly believes will violate the federal securities laws. What the
attorney's duties and loyalties are and should be in this and similar
situations is examined in the following section of this Article.
67. But see the court's disclaimer that "[tihe documents in question here must ... be seen in
light of the obligations which are part of the circumstances of this case. The Court makes no rule
regarding discovery as to corporations in general .... ." Id. at 368.
68. The Garner court characterized that situation as a "particularized context." 430 F.2d at
1101.
69. See text accompanying notes 17-18 supra.
70. See text accompanying note 21 supra.
71. One commentator contends that: "The suggestion that a lawyer representing a client
which plans to disregard the lawyer's advice that a course of action is illegal must withdraw from
representation and report the client's plan to the proper authorities is simultaneously the most
controversial and the most unimportant of the developments concerning lawyers' duties under the
securities acts. The question is relatively unimportant because clients have seldom proceeded in
the face of an attorney's advice that to do so is illegal and because in the future the situation will
arise even less often. One clear impact of Garner v. Wolfinbarger will be almost total compliance
with counsers injunctions that a planned course of action is illegal or will create liability, for that
advice is now subject to discovery by shareholders, and a management proceeding against
counsel's advice surely builds a strong case against itself." Shipman, supra note 31, at 276-77
(footnote omitted, italics deleted).
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IV. THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY:
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP AND THE DUTY
TO DISCLOSE FRAUD TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION
7 2
A. A Redefinition of the Securities Lawyer's Role
"The effective functioning of the federal securities laws contemplates
the involvement of professionals. ' 73 For example, although "there is
no requirement that disclosure documents filed with the [SEC] be
reviewed by attorneys, ... as a practical matter [it would] be difficult
for a layman to comply with all of the statutory requirements without
assistance of counsel. ''74 Securities counsel have pursued this review of
their clients' disclosure documents with such vigor that this role can
almost be termed adversarial to the client. 75
Ironically, these achievements of practicing lawyers in helping to
promote effective compliance with the securities laws are being used
today to support the proposition that "for the investment protection
purposes of the federal securities laws to be fulfilled, the attorney must
be made to serve two masters-his client and the investing public.1 76
Indeed, the SEC appears to be suggesting that in particular instances a
securities lawyer's duty to the investing public "might override the
loyalty to the client and even the lawyer-client privilege" 77 and
compel him to disclose otherwise confidential information. The SEC
sets forth this obligation to disclose confidential information in para-
graph 48(i) of the National Student Marketing complaint, which, as
noted earlier, 78 closely follows the language of DR 7-102(B)(1) of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. This may imply that the Code,
particularly DR 7-102(B)(1), is the SEC's basis for maintaining that
there are situations in which an attorney is compelled to disclose
information received from his client in the course of a professional
relationship.
72. See generally Leiman, supra note 18.
73. Sonde, supra note 12, at 1.
74. Id. at 1-2.
75. Cf. Freedman, A Civil Libertarian Looks at Securities Regulation, 35 Ohio St. L.J. 280
(1974).
76. Comment, SEC Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation,
Role and Responsibilities of the Attorney, 1972 Duke L.J. 969, 1018 (emphasis in original); see
Emerging Responsibilities, supra note 1. See generally Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, Professional
Responsibility-The Corporate Bar, in PLI Fourth Annual Institute on Securities Regulation
182-83 (R. Mundheim, A. Fleischer & J. Schupper eds. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Cohen, Wheat
& Henderson].
77. Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 183.
78. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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B. Some Thoughts on the Code of Professional Responsibility"
Any examination of an attorney's obligation to disclose or not
disclose material misstatements or omissions to the SEC must begin
with canon 4---"[a] lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets
of a client."
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law [while] "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.80
At first glance it appears that canon 4 would proscribe an attorney's
disclosure of his client's past, present, and future violations of the
antifraud provisions of the securities laws. In addition, canon 7, which
obligates a lawyer to represent a client "zealously," impliedly calls for
nondisclosure. The principles of canons 4 and 7 are weakened, how-
ever, by disciplinary rules under these canons.8'
DR 7-102(B)(1) provides:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that:
(1) His client has, in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a
person or tribunal shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if
his client refuses or is unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal, except when the information is protected as a privileged
communication.
8 2
If an individual embezzles money and later consults an attorney and
confesses the crime, DR 7-102(B)(1) does not purport to compel disclo-
sure, since this rule is applicable only when the fraud is committed "in
79. The Code consists of: (1) "Canons [which] are statements of axiomatic norms [which)
embody the general concepts from which the Ethical Consideration[s] and the Disciplinary Rules
are derived;" (2) "Ethical Considerations [which] are aspirational in character and represent the
objectives toward which every member of the profession should strive;" and (3) "Disciplinary
Rules [which] state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being
subject to disciplinary action." ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement
(1975).
At least one commentator contends that lawyers receive little guidance from the Code of
Professional Responsibility. See Freedman, The Second Circuit Judicial Conference, 174
N.Y.L.J., Sept. 24, 1975, at 1, col. 1.
80. DR 4-101(A). EC 4-4 states: "The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the ethical
obligation of a lawyer to guard the confidences and secrets of his client. This ethical precept,
unlike the evidentiary privilege, exists without regard to the nature or source of information or
the fact that others share the knowledge. .. "
81. DR 4-101(C), the disciplinary rule limiting the principle of canon 4, is discussed at text
accompanying notes 119-20 infra.
82. See also American College of Trial Lawyers, Code of Trial Conduct Rule 230) (rev. ed.
1972) (analogous provision); ABA Canons of Professional Ethics No. 41 (analogous provision of
pre-1970 canons).
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the course of the representation." Here there was clearly no continuing
fraud; any violation of the law took place entirely in the past, so,
consistent with the attorney-client privilege, DR 7-102(B)(1) does not
compel disclosure.8 3
The meaning of "in the course of the representation" is not entirely
clear and will be explored in greater detail. 84 For the moment,
however, it should be observed that
In the securities business, we are concerned almost invariably with . . . prospective
transactions, all of which may be held to be frauds, and even crimes, if the required
disclosure is not made.85
In other words, whereas past violations of the law normally fall within
the attorney-client privilege, in the "securities business" past disclosure
violations become the basis of ongoing disclosure violations if not
corrected in current and future disclosure documents. Thus, solely
because of the securities laws' continuing disclosure process, DR
7-102(B)(1) has raised problems for securities practitioners and their
clients by mandating disclosure of past-ongoing, present, and future
securities crimes or frauds.8
6
C. Analysis of DR 7-102(B)(1)8 7
1. "Clearly Establishing"
DR 7-102(B)(1) mandates an attorney's disclosure of his client's
misrepresentation or omission only where the misrepresentation or
omission clearly constitutes fraud, i.e., where the misrepresentation or
omission is clearly material. While it is certain that an attorney
preparing a securities disclosure document must reveal his client's
confidences or secrets if he knows that the information is material and
therefore is required to be disclosed, problems arise when considering
lesser degrees of scienter.88 Thus, where an attorney is in reckless
disregard of his client's material misrepresentation or omission, the
fraud may have been clearly established by objective standards, and if
83. If disclosure were compelled in this situation, the Code would be in direct conflict with
the attorney-client privilege, which protects past crimes or fraud. See pt. II1(A) supra.
84. See pt. IV(C)(2) infra.
85. Borden, Privilege and the Attorney-Client Relationship, in Expanding Responsibilities,
supra note 27, at 46-47 (emphasis added).
86. See generally Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76; Leiman, supra note 18.
87. See Address by A.A. Sommer, Jr., Two Problems for Lawyers, Corporate Counsel
Section, Dallas Bar Ass'n, Nov. 4, 1975.
88. One practitioner has said that clearly establishing "must mean something more than a
vague hint, but probably means something less than 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' " Lelman,
supra note 15, at 269.
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so should have been disclosed, even though it was not subjectively
clearly established to the attorney himself. Where, however, the attor-
ney is merely negligent in failing to discover and disclose his client's
material misrepresentation or omission, not only is the fraud not
subjectively established, but it is much less objectively "clearly estab-
lished" as well. In view of this objective and subjective uncertainty,
the attorney's conduct should be protected. Finally, there are situations
where an attorney has legitimate doubts as to the materiality6 9 of the
misrepresentation or omission and therefore is unable to say with any
reasonable certainty that a fraud is "clearly established." In the latter
case, at least, the fraud is not objectively "clearly established;" hence,
DR 7-102(B)(1) should not apply and the innocent attorney should not
be required to disclose the alleged violation to the Commission.9"
Various ethical considerations under canon 7 support this result. For
instance, a lawyer must "represent his client zealously within the
bounds of the law,"9 1 but "[t]he bounds of the law in a given case are
often difficult to ascertain." 92 "The advocate may urge any permissible
construction of the law favorable to his client, '93 and the adviser "may
continue in the representation of his client even though his client has
elected to pursue a course of conduct contrary to [his] advice.1 94
89. For various definitions of materiality see, e.g., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States,
406 U.S. 128, 153-54 (1972) (a material fact is one that "a reasonable investor might have
considered . . . important"); Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 384 (1970) (same);
Chris-Craft Indus., Inc. v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 480 F.2d 341, 363 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 910 (1973) ('whether a prototype reasonable investor would have relied'); SEC v. Texas
Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)
("material facts include... those facts ... which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell,
or hold the company's securities"); List v. Fashion Park, Inc., 340 F.2d 457, 462 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965) ("whether 'a reasonable man would attach importance' '); Felt v.
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544, 569 (E.D.N.Y. 1971) ("The SEC has
defined [materiality] by looking to what a reasonably prudent investor reasonably ought to know
before buying a security"); id. at 566 (full disclosure must be judged by what is material to the
sophisticated investor, the securities professional, and the less experienced investor); Escott v.
BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 681-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (prudent investor test);
Charles A. Howard, I S.E.C. 6, 8 (1934) (same); 17 C.F.R. § 230.401(1) (1975) (same).
90. Leonard Leiman, a well-known securities practitioner, has commented- "None of us has
any monopoly on the ability to determine what is or what is not material, and legitimate doubts
as to materiality of information ought to protect lawyers from an obligation to say that a violation
based on non-disclosure of the information clearly exists or, in the context of Disciplinary Rule
7-102(B), that the information clearly establishes that a fraud has been committed. If doubts as to
materiality cloud the issue, fraud is not 'clearly' established, and, presumably, no disclosure to
authorities concerning the putative violation would be required." Leiman, supra note 18, at
285-86.
91. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-1 (1975).
92. Id. EC 7-2.
93. Id. EC 7-4 (emphasis added).
94. Id. EC 7-5.
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These ethical considerations recognize the lawyer's fundamental and
paramount obligation to serve his client faithfully and vigorously,
despite any personal or professional feelings to the contrary. Doubts as
to materiality should be treated no differently.
Such doubts frequently arise in the complex area of undisclosed
contingent liabilities. 95 Consider the two following hypotheticals:
(1) Company X has violated the antitrust laws, and in six months the statute of
limitations will run. If the violation is disclosed, suits will be filed which will
bankrupt the company. If the violation is not disclosed, it is likely that it will go
undetected until the statute of limitations bars recovery. 96
(2) Company Y has discovered a serious title defect in one of its valuable properties.
The statute of limitations will expire in six months, and it is unlikely that anyone
will learn of the defect before then unless Company Y discloses it. If the facts are
revealed now, the company will lose two-thirds of its net worth. 97
At least two commentators have suggested that the possibility of
discovery may be considered in determining the materiality of the
contingency. 98 This appears to be a sensible approach, since a contin-
gent liability is material only if there is a real threat of its actualizing,
which in these hypotheticals would result only from disclosure. It is
not an attorney's duty to bankrupt his client for the sake of the public
investor, the result of disclosure on either of these sets of facts. 99
2. "In the Course of the Representation"
Where a lawyer is aware that his client intends to file a patently
deceptive securities document there is no doubt that if he does nothing
95. See Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Dev. Corp., 366 F. Supp. 374, 421 (S.D. Tex. 1973): "To
be material a statement ... need not necessarily relate to a past or existing condition or event. It
may refer to a prospective event, even though the event may not occur, provided there appears to
be a reasonable likelihood of its future occurrence ...
"In addition, 'Whether facts are material. . . when the facts related to a particular event...
will depend at any given time upon a balancing of both the indicated probability that the event
will occur and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of the company
activity.' " (quoting SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 849 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc),
cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969)); ABA, Statement of Policy Regarding Lawyers' Responses to
Auditors' Requests for Information (1976).
96. See Leiman, supra note 18, at 285-88.
97. See Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 233 (comments of Mr. Wheat).
98. See id. at 236-37 (comments of Mr. Cohen); Leiman, supra note 18, at 286-88. But see
Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 234-35 (comments of Mr. Pollack).
99. "[Tlhat your very disclosure can turn a merely contingent problem into an actual
problem, increases the seriousness of the question as to your obligation to your client in relation to
your obligation to the public investor." Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 237. But
see Lipman, supra note 14, at 465 ("the prime beneficiary of disclosure would not be the trading
markets, but rather the holder of a title defect claim who may have previously slept on hIs
rights'). See also Schneider, supra note 7, at 6-7.
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and remains in the service of his client he will be permitting his client
to perpetrate a fraud "in the course of the representation," and would
therefore become obligated to "reveal the fraud to the affected person
or tribunal." Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, however,
there are a number of steps the securities attorney should take prior to
turning in his client.
The attorney's first obligation is to inform management of the fraud
and request that it be corrected. If management agrees to do so, there
will be no problems under either the securities laws or the Code of
Professional Responsibility. If, however, management refuses to cor-
rect the misstatement or omission and insists upon filing a misleading
document with the SEC, the attorney's obligations to the corporate
entity °00 may require him to disclose the relevant facts "to [the] entire
board of directors, . . . particularly the outside directors."101 This
course of action was authorized in ABA Opinion 202, issued in
1940.102 There, an attorney retained by a corporation learned of
questionable activities by its officers and was convinced that the
officers would not make a full report to the board of directors. The
Committee said the attorney "may and should" make complete disclo-
sure to the board.10 3
This obligation to disclose to the board of directors is derived from
EC 7-8:
A lawyer should exert his best efforts to insure that decisions of his client are made
only after the client has been informed of relevant considerations. A lawyer ought to
initiate this decision-making process if the client does not do so.104
An understanding of EC 7-8, as applied to this situation where
management refuses to correct a misstatement or omission, depends
upon an understanding of who is the corporate client. EC 5-18
attempts to address this question by stating:
A lawyer employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to
the entity and not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other
person connected with the entity. 105
100. See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 5-18 (1975).
101. Shipman, supra note 31, at 278; see Gonson, supra note 12, at S.
102. ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Opinions, No. 202 (1940).
103. Id.
104. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-8 (1975) (emphasis added).
105. Unfortunately, "[t]he simple statement that a lawyer owes his allegiance to the 'entity' is
often inadequate: Management, the board of directors, and shareholders all may have varying
and sometimes conflicting interests in the resolution of a particular issue; and each may claim to
represent the best interests of the corporation. This might tend to confuse the lawyer's judgment
as to the best interests of the 'entity.' The commentators . . . have explored many of the
ramifications of the 'Who is your client?' issue in the corporate/securities area, and have generally
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If the full board of directors corrects the disclosure document, there
are no further difficulties. If, however, the board refuses to take action
to correct the misstatement or omission, or disputes the lawyer's
judgment that a material misstatement or omission has been made,
then, assuming the board is the "entity" for whom the lawyer works,
the lawyer must resign. However, if the board is not the client-if
further expansion of Garner v. Wolfinbarger 0 6 and its progeny' 0 7 leads
courts in some circumstances to regard the shareholders as the corpo-
rate client' 08-then the question becomes whether a lawyer confronted
with a board of directors that refuses to correct a misstatement or
omission should, under EC 7-8, notify the shareholders of the relevant
facts.
Although this course of action may have some theoretical appeal, as
a practical matter such disclosure might actually be detrimental to the
corporation since it might result in trading on the information'0 9 rather
than in removing the offending directors. Furthermore, the sharehold-
ers of a large, publicly-held corporation are just not a decision-making
group. Therefore, the lawyer faced with a recalcitrant board of direc-
tors should not, and presently does not, have to disclose the fraud to
the shareholders; rather, the attorney's obligation is to resign."10
In fact, since DR 7-102(B)(1) applies only to frauds committed in the
course of the representation, not before or after,"1 ' the only obligation
concluded that the CPR offers insufficient guidance on the subject." The Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Responsibility of Lawyers Engaged in Securities Law Practice--A Report
by the Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, 30 Bus. Law. 1289, 1293 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability]; see Sonde, supra note
12, at 9. On the other hand, the fact that the "entity" is the client may give an attorney comfort
when he finds himself faced with intransigent management and feels obligated to report possible
securities violations to the board of directors.
106. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971), discussed at text
accompanying notes 55-58 supra.
107. E.g., Valente v. Pepsico, Inc., 68 F.R.D. 361 (D. Del. 1975), discussed at text
accompanying notes 59-67 supra.
108. "The inference which is being drawn from [Garner v. Wolfinbarger] is that a corporate
lawyer's client is the stockholders." ABA Section of Litigation, Lawyers and Accountants on
Trial: Professional Liability 74 (1975) (remarks of Richard Sandier). But see Van Dusen, Who is
Counsel's Corporate Client, in Symposium, The Murky Divide: Professionalism and Professional
Responsibility, Business Judgment and Legal Advice-What is a Business Lawyer?, 31 Bus.
Law. 457, 474 (1975).
109. Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, supra note 105, at 1294.
110. The legal and accounting professions have reached an accord on the analagous problem
of disclosure of contingent liabilities. The two groups call only for counsel's resignation when the
client disregards advice to disclose an important unasserted claim. See ABA, Statement of Policy
Regarding Lawyers' Responses to Auditors' Requests for Information 6, 17 (1976); Wall St. J.,
Jan. 8, 1976, at 4, col. 2.
111. See Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24
Emory L.J. 747, 755 n.42 (1975) ("The affirmative duties imposed by the Rule appear to arise
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of an attorney confronted by a board of directors which intends to
make a future misstatement or omission despite his advice is to
resign. 112 He need not reveal his client's confidences or secrets to the
SEC or investors, since at the time of his resignation no fraud had
been committed. 113 Furthermore, if the corporation later goes forward
and files misleading documents, the attorney still need not disclose
because the fraud that arguably has been perpetrated" 14 did not take
place during the course of the representation." 5
From a policy standpoint and apart from the mandate of DR
7-102(B)(1), resignation should fulfill an attorney's obligations under
these facts. While the lawyer's unequivocal belief that a misleading
document is about to be filed necessitates his resignation, it may not
justify mandatory disclosure; his judgment as to materiality could be
wrong, and if it should later be resolved that the information in fact
was not material the lawyer will have been forced to breach his client's
trust, perhaps to his client's detriment, without any offsetting benefits
to the investing public.
These policies do not militate against permissive disclosure, how-
ever. For example, suppose that after an attorney resigns his former
client's new counsel calls up and says:
"I noticed that you were on this registration statement and that you no longer are. I
have been retained. Were there any specific problems that you encountered that you
think you ought to signal to me?"'"16
It has been suggested that in this case "to reveal the confidence of
the client directly might well be unethical." '" 7 However, this approach
is incorrect. Where the client refuses to correct alleged misstatements
or omissions, and plans to proceed with filing despite his attorney's
opinion that it will clearly violate the securities laws, it is likely that
the filing will constitute a willful violation of the criminal provisions of
the securities laws. 118 Even though DR 7-102(B)(1) does not, and for
during the course of representation and not during the course -of the fraud."). See generally
Leiman, supra note 18, at 269.
112. Commissioner Pollack has suggested that an attorney who resigns his employment
should protect himself by notifying the SEC of that fact. Leiman, supra note 15, at 283. Dean
Freedman, on the other hand, opposes even the mandatory withdrawal because it may lead to an
investigation of the circumstances surrounding the withdrawal, which in turn may lead to
disclosure of the fraud. Freedman, Legal Ethics, 174 N.Y.L.J., Aug. 27, 1975, at 2, col. 3.
113. Contra, Gonson, supra note 12, at 17.
114. See pt. IV(C)(3) infra.
115. See Leiman, supra note 18, at 278.
116. Id. at 280-81 (comments of Professor Mundheim).
117. Id. at 281.
118. Section 24 of the Securities Act provides for imprisonment for not more than five years
or a fine of not more than $10,000, or both, upon conviction of "any person who willfully, in a
registration statement. . . makes any untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any
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policy reasons should not, compel disclosure of an intention to commit
a possible future fraud, under DR 4-101(C)(3) it is permissible, 119 ahd
therefore not unethical, for an attorney to reveal "[t]he intention of his
client to commit a crime and the information necessary to prevent the
crime. '1 20 Therefore, when the client's intended future conduct ap-
pears to be criminal, rather than merely fraudulent, the better view is
that DR 4-101(C)(3) is available to permit the first attorney to reveal to
his successor information necessary to prevent the willful filing of false
and misleading disclosure documents. Indeed, under DR 4-101(C)(3), a
lawyer should even be protected were he to take thefirst step and call
the new counsel to apprise him of the relevant facts.
There is at least one factual situation where it can be said with
certainty that a fraud has been perpetrated by the client "in the course
of the representation." This is where an attorney discovers a material
misrepresentation or omission in a past public document or report
which he helped to prepare.
If a trading market is still being affected by the defective disclosure
document, or if investors who bought in reliance upon it still have
a right of rescission, the attorney must advise the corporation that
failure to correct the document is a continuing crime and fraud. If the
corporation does not issue a public correction, DR 7-102(B)(1) requires
the attorney to request correction, and failing that, to notify the
SEC.
12 1
material fact .. " 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970), as amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 77x (Supp. 1976). Section
32(a) of the Exchange Act provides for the imprisonment for not more than five years or a fine of
not more than $10,000, or both, upon conviction of "any person who willfully and knowingly
makes, or causes to be made, any statement in any application, report, or document .. . which
statement was false or misleading with respect to any material fact .. " Id. § 78ff(a) (1970), as
amended, 15 U.S.C.A. § 78ff(a) (Supp. 1976).
119. It must be stressed that DR 4-101(C)(3) is optional; the lawyer is not obligated to discuss
his former client's affairs, but to do so is not unethical. But see ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility DR4-101(C)(3), annot. 16 (1975): "ABA Opinion 314 (1965) indicates that a lawyer
must disclose even the confidences of his clients if 'the facts in the attorney's possession indicate
beyond reasonable doubt that a crime will be committed.' " (italics deleted).
120. DR 4-101(C)(3) (emphasis added; footnote omitted). It should be recalled that the
attorney-client privilege does not protect ongoing or future crimes or frauds. Since the client's
express intention to engage in conduct that appears to be criminal would not be privileged, even
apart from DR 4-101(C)(3) the attorney's disclosure would not breach a confidence. See ABA
Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(C)(3), annot. 15 (1975): "We held in Opinion 155
that a communication by a client to his attorney in respect to the future commission of an
unlawful act or to a continuing wrong is not privileged from disclosure. Public policy forbids that
the relation of attorney and client should be used to conceal wrongdoing on the part of the client."
(italics deleted). See also Meyerhofer v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 497 F.2d 1190 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 998 (1974) (construed DR 4-101(C)(4) as allowing an attorney to reveal
privileged information when necessary to defend himself in a lawsuit). One writer views
Meyerhofer as "an invitation to join counsel as a defendant as a device to open [his] files to
plaintiff's counsel." Leiman, supra note 18, at 290.
121. See Hazard, Attorney's Responsibilities and Duties, in Expanding Responsibilities, supra
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If, on the other hand, the investing public is no longer being affected
by the misleading document, and the right of rescission is no longer
available, then there is no ongoing crime or fraud, and so disclosure
would be unnecessary. Since disclosure would do little to rectify the
effects of the past misstatement or omission, the underlying purposes
of DR 4-101(C)(3) and DR 7-102(B)(1) would not be furthered by
disclosure and there would be no reason to compel an attorney to
violate the confidences and secrets of his client.' 22
The most difficult situation is where an attorney learns of a material
misstatement or omission by the client in a document filed before the
representation began. Here it can be argued that the attorney-should
have no obligation to disclose the information to the SEC because the
fraud technically was not perpetrated "in the course of the representa-
tion." In addition, since the attorney did not participate in the dis-
semination of the disclosure document, it can be argued that the
investing public has not relied upon his expertise. On the other hand,
it is arguable that as long as the disclosure document is still affecting
the trading market the fraud continues and therefore is "in the course
of the representation." 123 It also can be argued that even though the
investing public has not relied upon this attorney, his silence effec-
tively condones continued reliance on his predecessor's expertise.
While it is arguable that a lawyer should not be responsible for
documents he did not prepare, and so should not have to reveal
ongoing frauds initiated before his representation began, there is no
doubt that the attorney may not participate in the preparation of a
subsequent document perpetuating the material misstatements or
omissions.
3. "Perpetrated a Fraud"
Some writers question whether filing materially misleading periodic
reports with the SEC should be considered a fraud. 1 24 They argue that
DR 7-102(B)(1) contemplates fraud in the stringent common law sense
only,1 25 while others claim that it includes the more attenuated concept
of fraud that prevails in the securities field. 126
note 27, at 30 (comments of Messrs. Loss and Flom); Leiman, supra note 18, at 278. But see id.
at 280.
122. See Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, supra note 105, at 1301.
123. See generally Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 233-35.
124. Introduction to Expanding Responsibilities, supra note 27, at x.
125. See Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 224. See generally Lipman, supra
note 18, at 461.
126. Introduction to Expanding Responsibilities, supra note 27, at xi-xii. These commentators
support their interpretation by referring to the existence of criminal penalties for willful and
knowing violation of the securities acts (see note 118 supra and accompanying text). They argue
that a client who proceeds to file a disclosure document despite his attorney's warning that it will
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The latter view is the more sensible. To say that fraud as used in
DR 7-102(B)(1) does not include securities violations is tantamount to
saying that securities fraud is exempt from the disciplinary rule. Given
the tremendous harm a misleading disclosure document can cause, it is
inconceivable that the drafters of DR 7-102(B)(1) could have intended
such a result.
4. "Upon a Person or Tribunal"
Another question often raised is whether the SEC is a "person" or
"tribunal" to whom a fraud must be revealed pursuant to DR
7-102(B)(1). Since the Code of Professional Responsibility defines "per-
son" as "a corporation, an association, a trust, a partnership, and any
other organization or legal entity, ' 127 "the SEC is clearly a 'person';
whether or not it is a person 'affected' by a fraud and thus a person to
whom a fraud may be disclosed will usually be irrelevant [since]
[m]embers of the public . . . will clearly be 'affected' by a securities
fraud-and disclosure to the SEC will necessarily be made in conjunc-
tion with . . . disclosure to the public."'
2 8
The Code defines "tribunal" as "all courts and all other adjudicatory
bodies ,"129 and "[t]hroughout the [Code] 'tribunal' is used in the
context of the adversary system .... -130 When the SEC receives
disclosure documents from reporting companies it is not functioning as
an adjudicatory body, so in that context the SEC apparently is not a
"tribunal.' 3 1 On the other hand, the SEC would be a "tribunal" when
conducting a hearing or similar proceeding. 132
Denying the SEC the status of a "tribunal" would appear to have at
least one important consequence. Under DR 7-102(B)(2), a lawyer who
receives information clearly establishing that "[a] person other than his
client has perpetrated a fraud upon a tribunal shall promptly reveal
the fraud to the tribunal."'1 33 Thus if the SEC were a tribunal, the
clearly violate the securities laws is in all probability willfully or knowingly making a statement
that is false or misleading with respect to a material fact and is thereby perpetrating a fraud. Id.
127. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Definition No. 3 (1975).
128. Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, supra note 105, at 1298-99; see
Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 Emory L.J.
747, 756 (1975) ("An affected person, even under Rule 10b-5, may be the purchaser or seller who
was a party to the fraud, but not the SEC.").
129. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Definition No. 6 (1975).
130. Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, supra note 105, at 1299; see, e.g.,
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-35, EC 7-39 (1975).
131. See Lipman, supra note 14, at 458 ("When acting as administrators or enforcers of the
laws under their jurisdiction, administrative agencies are not considered tribunals under the Code
of Professional Responsibility."). But see Expanding Responsibilities, supra note 27, at x, xii, 9.
132. See Committee on Counsel Responsibility and Liability, supra note 105, at 1299.
133. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(B)(2) (1975).
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attorney faced with a client determined to violate the securities laws
could merely resign; but if after resigning the violation ultimately did
occur he would be obligated to reveal the clearly established fraud of
the "person other than his client" to the SEC as the affected tribunal.
Conversely, if the SEC is not a tribunal then the attorney in this
situation need not disclose to the SEC. 134
5. "Except When the Information is Protected as a Privileged Com-
munication"
The above language was recently added to the ABA draft of DR
7-102(B)(1), 135 presumably to protect confidences that would be pro-
tected under state law by the attorney-client privilege.1 36 However,
since ongoing and prospective crimes or frauds are not privileged, 137
most securities crimes or frauds will not be protected. 138 Thus, the
1974 amendment should not significantly reduce disclosure under DR
7-102(B)(1).
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is broader
than DR 7-102(B)(1); that is, there is no privilege for any ongoing or
future crimes or frauds, regardless of whether they occur during or
after the attorney's representation. As a result, even though an attor-
ney resigning prior to the perpetration of the crime or fraud would not
be required under DR 7-102(B)(1) to take the initiative and report his
client, 139 an attorney subpoenaed to a judicial proceeding would be
compelled to testify as to this unprivileged matter. This result is not
troublesome, for it seems less egregious to require an attorney to testify
once he has been subpoenaed, than to make him take the first step and
turn in his client.
134. See Daley & Karmel, Attorneys' Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24
Emory L.J. 747, 755-56 (1975).
135. It appears that this language has not yet been adopted in New York. See N.Y.S.B.A.,
The Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(B)(1) (1970), as amended (1975);
N.Y.S.B.A., Special Comm. to Review the Code of Professional Responsibility, Report on the
Provisions Relating to Confidences, Secrets and the Duty of Diligence to the Client 7 (1975)
(proposes that when the client refuses to rectify a past fraud or refrain from a prospective fraud
the attorney be required to withdraw or request permission to withdraw, rather than reveal the
fraud).
136. Leiman, supra note 18, at 269.
137. See pt. II(B) supra.
138. See Gonson, supra note 12, at 16-17. One commentator has stated that he "cannot see
that the additional language .. . contributes much to the learning on the subject or why it
deserves much attention . . . ." Leiman, supra note 18, at 270; cf. id. at 281-85 (remarks of
Commissioner Pollack).
139. See text accompanying notes 111-115 supra. But under DR 4-101(C)(3) he would be
permitted to reveal his client's intention to commit a crime. See text accompanying notes 119-120
supra.
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V. ATTORNEY LIABILITY
A. Aiding and Abetting
1. Present State of the Law
The crux of the SEC's case against the attorneys [in National Student Marketing 4 ]
and the principal cause for concern among securities lawyers . . . lies in the
Commission's attempt to make attorneys in their role as counsel [, rather than as
primary participants,] subject to securities-fraud liability. While the SEC has alleged
that the [attorneys] violated . . ., conspired to violate [, and aided and abetted
violations] of the securities laws,1 41 the Commission will probably rely most heavily
[on the aiding and abetting allegation]. The lines are unclear between the three kinds
of violations-participation, aiding-abetting, and conspiracy 142 -but the lawyer's role
of counseling and assisting fits most comfortably under the aiding and abetting
rubric. 14
3
The question of what scienter should be required for a court to
impose aiding and abetting liability on a professional "has been a
source of controversy in federal securities law . . ",144
In SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 145 the Second Circuit remanded to the
district court for a determination of whether the attorney had been
negligent in issuing an opinion letter that was used to sell unregistered
stock in violation of the securities laws. In remanding, Chief Judge
Kaufman stated that it is not necessary to show
actual knowledge of the improper scheme plus an intent to further that scheme [, but
rather] the negligence standard [is] sufficient in the context of enforcement proceedings
seeking equitable or prophylactic relief. 146
140. See note 22 supra.
141. The complaint alleges that White & Case, and Lord, Bissell & Brook, among others,
"singly and in concert, directly and indirectly violated and aided and abetted violations of Section
17(a) of the Securities Act [15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1970)], Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act [15
U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1970)] and Rule lOb-5" promulgated thereunder (17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975));
and that White & Case, among others, "singly and in concert directly and indirectly violated and
aided and abetted violations of Section 13(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78m(a) (1970)] and
Rules 13a-1 and 13a-13 thereunder [17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-1, 240.13a-13 (1975)];" and "Section
14(a) of the Exchange Act [15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1970)] and Rules 14a-3 and 14a-9 thereunder (17
C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-3, 240.14a-9 (1975)]." National Student Marketing Complaint, supra note 22,
48(k)-(m).
142. See Ruder, Multiple Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting,
Conspiracy, In Pan Delicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 597, 600
(1972).
143. Note, Securities Regulation-Attorneys' Liability-Advising, Abetting, and the SEC's
National Student Marketing Offensive, 50 Texas L. Rev. 1265, 1267 (1972) (emphasis In original)
[hereinafter cited as Attorneys' Liability].
144. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 729 (9th Cir. 1974); see Ruder, supra note 144, at
630-31. See also 2 A. Bromberg, Securities Law: Fraud, SEC Rule 10b-5, § 8.5, at 530-39 (1975);
Restatement of Torts § 876(b) (1939).
145. 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (SEC enforcement action for attorney's allegedly negligent
issuance of opinion letter used to illegally distribute unregistered stock); see Cheek, supra note 11,
at 608-09. For a discussion of Spectrum see Lipman, supra note 14, at 443-47.
146. 489 F.2d at 541. Thus far a negligence standard of aiding and abetting has not been
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The Spectrum decision may have been tempered by a later Second
Circuit decision, SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc. 147 There, Chief
Judge Kaufman, in discussing the degree of culpability needed to
impose liability on aiders and abettors, referred to Spectrum, and said:
In Spectrum we ruled that the liability of a lawyer as an aider and abettor was to be
measured by the negligence standard generally applicable to SEC injunction actions
and the high degree of carelessness present there. 149
Chief Judge Kaufman stated that the attorney in Spectrum "could
easily have concluded that the opinion letter which he issued was likely
to be used to sell unregistered securities,"1 49 in contrast to the attorney
in Management Dynamics who could not have known that his activity
was furthering an illegal scheme.
Although Spectrum is not the rule in all circuits,150 the Seventh
Circuit recently adopted a negligence standard for aiding and abet-
ting,151 and the Ninth Circuit has rejected scienter in favor of a
"flexible duty standard, '15 2 which presumably would apply to both.
adopted in a damage action against an attorney, but has been applied in damage actions against
accountants, see Hocbfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 44
U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S. far. 30, 1976), and a stock exchange, see Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock
Exch., 503 F.2d 364, 374-75 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974).
147. 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975).
148. Id. at 811 (emphasis added).
149. Id.
150.- For a delineation of the split in the circuits on the scienter requirement for aiding and
abetting see SEC v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 402 F. Supp. 641, 648-49 (D.D.C. 1975);
Brodsky, Attorneys' Liability for Aiding, Abetting, 175 N.Y.L.J., Jan. 7, 1976, at 1, col. 1. For a
review of Second Circuit decisions on aiding and abetting see SEC v. Universal Major Indus.
Corp., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,229 (S.D.N.Y., 1975). For a comparison of
Sixth Circuit and Second Circuit cases see ABA Comm. on Business Torts, Section of Litigation,
Liability of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws 27-31 (P. Gruenberger 1975).
151. Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir.), rev'd, 44 U.S.L.W. 4451 (U.S.
Mar. 30, 1976), (accountants); Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., 503 F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974) (stock exchange). On the related question of whether knowledge of
fraud coupled with mere inaction constitutes aiding and abetting see SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co.
(S.D.N.Y.), discussed in 175 N.Y.L.J., Feb. 27, 1976, at 1, col. 3 (SEC complaint filed against
issuer who knew of but did nothing to correct misrepresentations of its broker); Fischer v.
N.Y.S.E., [Current Binder] CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 95,416 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Brennan v.
Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673, 682 (N.D. Ind. 1966), judgment for plaintiff
on merits, 286 F. Supp. 702, 704, 729-30 (N.D. Ind. 1968), aff'd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 989 (1970). Brennan relied on the Restatement of Torts standard "[f]or
harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another," i.e., "a person is liable if
he '(b) knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself, or (c) gives substantial assistance to the
other in accomplishing a tortious result and his own conduct, separately considered, constitutes a
breach of duty to the third person.' " 259 F. Supp. at 680, quoting Restatement of Torts § 876
(1939).
152. White v. Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730-36 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth Circuit's use of a
"duty analysis" rather than a "scienter analysis" permits a jury to find liability for what would be
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aiding and abetting and primary securities violations cases. The Sixth
Circuit represents the traditional view that actual knowledge or reck-
less disregard of the existence of the scheme is necessary to impose
aiding and abetting liability. 15 3 The Supreme Court heard oral argu-
ment on the issue this term.15
4
2. Suggested Liability for Breach of Duty to Disclose Fraud' 55
Regardless of the standard that evolves for non-lawyers, 5 6 should
an attorney preparing disclosure documents be held liable as an aider
or abettor when, faced with a client who is about to violate the
securities laws, he resigns his employment without disclosing the
fraud? Or, under the same facts, should he be liable if he negligently
fails to realize that a materially misleading document is being filed and
negligently remains in the employment without revealing "the fraud to
the affected person or tribunal"? 157
It is axiomatic that "[t]he SEC's concern with respect to the respon-
sibility of attorneys stems principally from the federal securities laws,
rather than from ethical obligations imposed by [the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility]."'1 8 Indeed, the Code itself makes clear that it
does not attempt to define standards for civil liabilities arising out of
lawyers' professional conduct.' 5 9 However, the standards embodied in
considered negligence under traditional state of mind analysis. See 16 B.C. Ind, & Comm. L.
Rev. 515 (1975).
153. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1316 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975);
see SEC v. Frank, 388 F.2d 486, 489 (2d Cir. 1968), where the Second Circuit had formerly
imposed a knowledge requirement on aiders and abettors.
154. The Supreme Court heard oral argument in Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 909 (1975) (negligence standard of accountants' aiding and
abetting). After this Article went to press the Supreme Court handed down its decision in Hochfelder, 44
U.S. L.W. 4451 (U.S. Mar. 30, 1976), holding that scienter is required for primary liability in lob-S
private damage actions. The Hochfelder standard of care does not apply to injunctive suits, and so
Spectrum is still the law. In any event, Hochfelder supports this author's view of the standard of care
that should be adopted.
155. This Article is concerned with the attorney's duty to disclose, not his independent duty to
investigate. The attorney's duty to disclose concerns the attorney as a drafter of disclosure
documents, not as a writer of opinion letters. It should be recalled that SEC v, Spectrum, Ltd.,
489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973) (negligence standard in SEC action for aiding and abetting), involved
the attorney as a writer of opinion letters.
156. It should be recalled that Hochfelder v. Ernst & Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100 (7th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 421 U.S. 909 (1975) (accountants), and Hochfelder v. Midwest Stock Exch., S03
F.2d 364 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 875 (1974) (stock exchange), did not involve attorneys'
aiding and abetting.
157. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility DR 7-102(B)(1) (1975).
158. Gonson, supra note 12, at 9.
159. ABA Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1975).
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the Code, and in DR 7-102(B)(1) in particular, do reflect the interests of
society, and courts and the SEC ought to respect them. '6 0 Therefore, it
is submitted that the Code should be the cornerstone of an analysis of
attorney aiding and abetting liability.
Thus, an attorney's failure to disclose a client's fraud should subject
him to aider and abettor liability only when he remains in the
representation with knowledge of, or in reckless disregard of, his
client's violation of the law.' 61 Where he resigns before the violation
occurs, or remains in the employment while negligently failing to
realize that a violation is occuring or will occur,' 62 there should be no
aider and abettor liability, since under DR 7-102(B)(1) there is no duty
to disclose in this situation. 163
This scienter standard is consistent with DR 7-102(B)(1) which
requires that the fraud be clearly established' 64 before imposing upon
an attorney a duty to reveal the fraud. If a negligence standard were to
apply, the securities attorney, to avoid personal liability, would have
to disclose, even if the fraud were not "clearly established."'16s This
would be contrary to the letter of the Code and would impose a greater
duty on securities lawyers than other lawyers.'
66
The determination of the "materiality" of a misstated or omitted fact
involves delicate questions of fact and judgment.
[The] kind of case . . .where the wrongdoing of the client is both serious and clear,
and where the lawyer participates in the wrongdoing in a substantial way while
knowing of the illegality or recklessly disregarding it.. . should be distinguished from
160. Cf. Cheek, supra note 11, at 618. In fact, as suggested earlier (see note 32 supra), the
SEC appears to have relied upon the language of DR 7-102(B)(1) of the Code in drafting
paragraph 48(i) of the National Student Marketing complaint, either out of respect for the
interests advanced by the Code, or out of the necessity to base its complaint upon some
pre-existing duty of which the attorneys had notice.
161. Attorneys' Liability, supra note 143, at 1271; see text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
162. See text accompanying notes 88-89 supra.
163. See pt. IV(C)(1)-(2) supra.
164. See pt. IV(C)(1) supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 88-90 supra for the distinction between objective and
subjective standards of "dearly established."
166. It has been suggested that because of the SEC's and the public's reliance on the securities
lawyer he should be held to a higher standard than other attorneys. See SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd.,
489 F.2d 535, 541-42 (2d Cir. 1973); National Student ,1arketing Complaint, supra note 22;
Emanuel Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), (1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,407, at 83,175 n.20; Emerging Responsibilities, supra note 1; United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 806 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970) (where no
specific generally accepted accounting principle controlled, jury not required to accept expert
witness's testimony as to the accountant's standard of conduct); cf. Herzfeld v. Laventhol,
Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 112, 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (an auditor's compliance
with generally accepted accounting principles will not necessarily insulate him from securities
liability).
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situations where the illegality of the client's act is not clear and a question of judgment
is involved. 167
Where it is not "clearly established" that a fraud has or will occur the
lawyer has a duty to voice his reservations to the client. But if the
client decides to file the disclosure document, in hopes that the lawyer's
judgment as to the-misleading nature or materiality of a particular fact
is wrong, 161
then the lawyer who continues to render legal services to the client in connection with
the [document] should not be liable as an "aider and abettor," even if a tribunal
ultimately decides that the action of his client was unlawful.169
Imposing a negligence standard of aiding and abetting would also be
contrary to the policy of the attorney-client privilege because of
[t]he substantial public interest in encouraging clients to seek legal advice-which is
reflected in the attorney-client privilege-and in having lawyers able to provide
reasonable professional advice without being guarantors of the ultimate correctness of
all of their opinions ....
Any other result would force lawyers either to refuse to perform legal services in
every situation where there is any possibility . . . of client liability, or to charge fees
commensurate with their guarantor status. Neither result would be in the public
interest. 170
Thus, regardless of the standard that evolves for other professionals,
the policy underlying the attorney-client privilege, i.e., the fostering of
effective legal representation, should preclude the imposition of a
negligence standard for attorney aiding and abetting for failure to
disclose fraud. 171 An increased threat of civil liability for attorneys
failing to disclose their clients' alleged wrongdoing could affect the
availability of, or quality of, legal services in the securities field. 17 2
B. SEC Rule of Practice 2(e)
SEC Rule of Practice 2(e) provides in part:
(e) Suspension and disbarment.
(1) The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of
167. Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 223; see Committee on Counsel
Responsibility and Liability, supra note 105, at 1298, 1301; Lawyers, Clients and Securities
Laws, 61 A.B.A.J. 1085 (1975); pt. IV (c)(1) supra.
168. Cohen, Wheat & Henderson, supra note 76, at 223.
169. Id.
170. Id.; see Cheek, supra note 11, at 632; Leiman, supra note 18, at 272-74; Lipman, supra
note 14, at 469-70; Ruder, supra note 142, at 638, 645-46; Schneider, supra note 7, at 9-16; Small,
An Attorney's Responsibilities Under Federal and State Securities Laws: Private Counselor or
Public Servant?, 61 Calif. L. Rev. 1189 (1973). But see Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 438.
171. See Note, A New Ethic of Disclosure-National Student Marketing and the Attorney-
Client Privilege, 48 Notre Dame Law. 661 (1973). See generally Sonde, supra note 12.
172. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
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appearing or practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the
Commission after notice of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess
the requisite qualifications to represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or
integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to
have willfully violated, or willfully aided and abetted the violation of any provision of
the Federal securities laws . . . or the rules and regulations thereunder.'"
In a SEC rule 2(e) disciplinary proceeding against an attorney,' 74 is
a showing that a lawyer's conduct is consistent with the Code of
Professional Responsibility, for example DR 7-102(B)(1), sufficient to
protect him from any disciplinary action by the Commission? It is
submitted that such a showing should suffice, for substantially the
same reasons that an attorney should not be held liable as an aider and
abettor: liability would be contrary to the letter of DR 7-102(B)(1)
which requires that the fraud be "clearly established," and contrary to
the policy of the attorney-client privilege to encourage quality legal
services. 175 Furthermore, rule 2(e) seems to compel a scienter require-
ment insofar as it explicitly requires the aiding and abetting to be
willful. 176
The Code of Professional Responsibility remains the primary
guideline by which an attorney fashions his professional conduct. 177 It
has been adopted by most state bar groups and incorporated into the
rules of practice of most courts "either in haec verba or in substantial
part. ' 178 The SEC (and courts) should defer to the customary practices
of the profession and the policies that they reflect.
In a number of cases the SEC seems to have embraced this position
by explicitly or implicitly relying on ethical canons to discipline a
lawyer. 179 However, in a recent administrative disbarment proceeding
173. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1975).
174. For examples of rule 2(e) administrative disciplinary proceedings against lawyers see
Schwebel v. Orrick, 153 F. Supp. 701 (D.D.C. 1957), affd per curiam on other grounds, 251
F.2d 919 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 927 (1958); Morris Mac Schwebel, 40 S.E.C. 347
(1960), modified, 40 S.E.C. 459 (1961); Albert J. Fleischmann, 37 S.E.C. 832 (1950); Emanuel
Fields, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), (1973 Transfer Binder] CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 79,407.
175. See pt. V(A) supra.
176. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(iii) (1975).
177. Professional codes of conduct have been in existence since 1887. See Comment, SEC
Disciplinary Rules and the Federal Securities Laws: The Regulation, Role and Responsibilities of
the Attorney, 1972 Duke L.J. 969, 976-77.
178. Expanding Responsibilities, supra note 27, at 10; see, e.g., N.Y. Judiciary Law
(McKinney 1975) (Code adopted in New York); Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann., tit. 14, app., art. 12,
§ 8 (1973 & Supp. 1975) (Code adopted in Texas); S.D.N.Y. Gen. R. 5(f) (Code adopted in the
Southern District of New York); E.D. Pa. R. 11 (Code adopted in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania); 438 Pa. xxv (1970) (Code adopted by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania).
179. E.g., Murray A. Kivitz, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5163 (June 29, 1971), rv'd,
Kivitz v. SEC, 475 F.2d 956 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (canons 34 and 35 of the Canons of Professional
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the Commission specifically stated that it did not feel bound by
standards of conduct and ethical duties imposed by state courts upon
the profession as a whole, but rather could impose a greater ethical
standard upon securities lawyers. 180
VI. CONCLUSION
It has been suggested that when a client plans to file a materially
misleading disclosure document with the SEC, the attorney may resign
prior to the perpetration of the fraud and thereby avoid the disclosure
mandated by DR 7-102(B)(1). Concededly, where the client's proposed
course of action is especially egregious, the attorney's withdrawal and
nondisclosure may fail to prevent undesirable consequences for the
investing public. However, this perhaps unfortunate course of conduct
is not compelled by DR 7-102(B)(1); while the rule does not compel
disclosure when the attorney's resignation occurs prior to his client's
fraud, it also does not compel nondisclosure. Under these circumstan-
ces, the attorney should look to DR 4-101(C)(3) which, consistent with
the crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege, permits the
attorney to reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and
the information necessary to prevent the crime."
Although in the above case disclosure is only permissive, it is hoped
that with sensitivity and care an attorney will be able to recognize
those situations where, due to the exceptional nature of his client's
proposed activity, it is his moral, although not legal, obligation to
disclose the relevant facts to the SEC, which is in a position to prevent
the crime.
Generally, however, an attorney's duty should go no further. The
SEC must temper its enthusiasm "to vindicate public wrongs with a
recognition that Draconian or unpredictable standards will demoralize
the securities bar and damage the public interest." 181 The SEC's
demand that attorneys become its agents in enforcing compliance with
the federal securities laws will erode the trust and confidence upon
which the attorney-client relationship is based, and undermine the
quality of representation of the securities bar.
Ethics). See also Irwin L. Germaise & Thomas F. Quinn, SEC Securities Act Release No. 5216
(Dec. 7, 1971) (materially misleading omission in failing to disclose conflict of interest).
180. Emanuel Fields, Securities Act Release No. 5404 (June 18, 1973), [1973 Transfer Binder]
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 79,407, at 83,175 n.20; see note 166 supra. See generally Lipman,
supra note 14, at 441-42.
181. Lowenfels, supra note 2, at 438; cf. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 479 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting): "Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty
when the Government's purposes are beneficent. . . . The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in
insidious encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understanding."
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